Risk Management Theory: A comprehensive empirical assessment Working Paper
There have been many empirical studies aiming at finding support for the various theories of corporate financial risk management. However, subsequent research papers failed to determine which theories are supported by the data and which are not. In consequence both theoretical research efforts and the design of applied methods for corporate risk management are stalled by the inability to decide which theoretical approach to follow. After a spate of new research in this field in the late 90's there have been few studies that added to our understanding of corporate hedging behaviour. Incidentally, most valuable pieces of research in recent years concentrated on methodological issues: the endogeneity problem (Jin and Jorion, 2006) , inclusion of non-derivative hedging (Davies et al., 2006; Judge, 2006) , and assumptions about the purpose of derivative use (Faulkender, 2005) . In this paper I follow the methodological strain of research and propose verification of risk management theory which is focused not on individual hypotheses but on theories. I also attempt to provide strong evidence as to the verification status of these theories by using a number of methods and subjecting hypotheses to repeated testing. This paper aims to design and conduct an exhaustive empirical investigation into all major corporate risk management theories, which would provide strong statement of their verification status. The theories considered include risk management models developed within the body of the following theories of the firm: financial theory, agency theory, stakeholder theory and new institutional economics. Consequently, while most research papers present the hypotheses in sections concentrated around particular determinants of risk management, I discuss them in the order of theories from which they originated.
The inclusion of new institutional economics and stakeholder theory, none of which has been tested in the context of risk management, is the first attempt to introduce these theories to empirical research in the field. Both theories are relatively new and immature.
However, since they offer a new perspective on the problem of hedging, it is worthwhile to consider them.
Another contribution of this paper is a cohesive testing methodology. First of all, I designed a set of hypotheses basing on previous research. Secondly, despite using a new approach to empirical verification, I strived to maintain comparability with previous studies in terms of hypotheses and statistical methods. Thirdly, I tested hypotheses using a wide range of statistical methods, with repeated testing of the same hypothesis, which provided double verification of results. These issues are discussed in the section on methodology below.
The choice of data also provides a new insight into risk management practices of companies. The dataset for this study comprises annual report data for 150 Polish listed companies, in the period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Few studies of economic theories are carried out using emerging market data. In the period examined Polish companies had ready access to derivatives and were subject to International Accounting Standard 32 and 39 regulation.
However only 30% used hedging, far fewer than in developed European or overseas markets.
It is therefore interesting to investigate this new market and check if research results match those from different markets.
Theories and previous research Financial economics approach
Financial economics approach to corporate risk management has so far been the most prolific in terms of both theoretical model extensions and empirical research. This approach builds upon classic Modigliani-Miller paradigm (Miller and Modigliani, 1958) which states conditions for irrelevance of financial structure for corporate value. This paradigm was later extended to the field of risk management. This approach stipulates also that hedging leads to lower volatility of cash flow and therefore lower volatility of firm value. Rationales for corporate risk management were deduced from the irrelevance conditions and included:
higher debt capacity (Miller and Modigliani, 1963) , progressive tax rates, lower expected costs of bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz, 1985) , securing internal financing (Froot et al., 1993) , information asymmetries (Geczy et al., 1997) and comparative advantage in information (Stulz, 1996) . The ultimate result of hedging, if it indeed is beneficial to the firm, should be higher value -a hedging premium.
Evidence to support the predictions of financial economics theory approach to risk management is poor. Although risk management does lead to lower variability of corporate value (e.g. Jin and Jorion, 2006) , which is the main prerequisite for all other effects, there seems to be little proof of this being linked with benefits specified by the theory. One of the most widely cited papers by Tufano (1996) finds no evidence to support financial hypotheses, and concentrates on the influence of managerial preferences instead. On the other hand, the higher debt capacity hypothesis seems to be verified positively, as shown by Faff and Nguyen (2002) , Graham and Rogers (2002) and Guay (1999) . Internal financing hypothesis was positively verified by Guay (1999) and Geczy et al. (1997) , while it was rejected by Faff and Guyen (2002) and Mian (1996) . Judge (2006) found evidence in support of financial distress hypothesis. Tax hypothesis was verified positively by Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) , while other studies verified it negatively (Mian, 1996 ; Graham and Rogers, 2002) . More recently Jin and Jorion (2006) provide strong evidence of lack of value relevance of hedging, although some previous studies have identified a hedging premium (Allayannis and Weston, 2001, Carter et al., 2006 The next hypothesis tests for a hedging premium by looking at companies that start hedging, rather than a cross-section of hedgers vs. non-hedgers, following the approach of Guay (1999) .
Hypothesis 1c: Firms that begin hedging experience a rise in market value of equity.
According to debt capacity and tax incentive rationales, firms should be interested in raising their gearing ratios, using the tax shield to the full extent, and lowering their tax charges. Hedging facilitates this by lowering risk of default and allowing higher debt capacity. Lower volatility of earnings may also result in lower average tax charges if the tax curve is concave, however in Poland corporate income tax is flat-rate so this effect is not important. 
Agency theory
Agency theory extends the analysis of the firm to include separation of ownership and control, and managerial motivation. In the field of corporate risk management agency issues have been shown to influence managerial attitudes toward risk taking and hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Theory also explains a possible mismatch of interest between shareholders, management and debt holders due to asymmetries in earning distribution, which can result in the firm taking too much risk or not engaging in positive net value projects (Mayers and Smith, 1987) . Consequently, agency theory implies that defined hedging policies can have important influence on firm value (Fite and Pfleiderer, 1995) . The latter hypotheses are associated with financing structure, and give predictions similar to financial theory.
Managerial motivation factors in implementation of corporate risk management have been empirically investigated in a few studies with a negative effect (Faff and Nguyen, 2002; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Geczy et al., 1997) . Notably, positive evidence was found however by Tufano (1996) in his analysis of the gold mining industry in the US. Financial policy hypotheses were tested in studies of the financial theory, since both theories give similar predictions in this respect. All in all, the bulk of empirical evidence seems to be against agency theory hypotheses however. 
New Institutional Economics
A different perspective on risk management is offered by new institutional economics.
The focus is shifted here to governance processes and socio-economic institutions that guide these processes, as explained by Williamson (1998) . Although no empirical studies of new institutional economics approach to risk management have been carried out so far, the theory offers an alternative explanation of corporate behavior. Namely, it predicts that risk management practices may be determined by institutions or accepted practice within a market or industry. Moreover, the theory links security with specific assets purchase (Williamson, 1987) , which implies that risk management can be important in contracts which bind two sides without allowing diversification, such as large financing contract or close cooperation within a supply chain. 
Stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory, developed originally by Freeman (1984) as a managerial instrument, has since evolved into a theory of the firm with high explanatory potential.
Stakeholder theory focuses explicitly on an equilibrium of stakeholder interests as the main determinant of corporate policy. The most promising contribution to risk management is the extension of implicit contracts theory from employment to other contracts, including sales and financing (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987) . In certain industries, particularly high-tech and services, consumer trust in the company being able to continue offering its services in the future can substantially contribute to company value. However, the value of these implicit claims is highly sensitive to expected costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. Since corporate risk management practices lead to a decrease in these expected costs, company value rises (Klimczak, 2005) . Therefore stakeholder theory provides a new insight into possible rationale for risk management. However, it has not yet been tested directly.
Investigations of financial distress hypothesis (Smith and Stulz, 1995) provide only indirect evidence (e.g. Judge, 2006) . I have designed the following hypotheses to test for the usefulness of this theory in risk management research. The first hypothesis addresses the importance of customer trust and resulting potentially high costs of financial distress in IT and service sectors. The second hypothesis also looks at financial distress costs, but in a general manner -companies with high intangible or human assets, and growth options are more sensitive to continuity problems. This is essentially the same as hypothesis 1j of financial economics. And finally, smaller firms are more prone to financial problems, which should increase their interest in risk management practices. The last hypothesis is however in clear contrast to all previous empirical evidence.
Hypothesis 4a: Hedging is more popular among firms form IT and service sectors. Hypothesis 4b: Companies with high market-to-book value hedge more. Hypothesis 4c: Hedging is more common among smaller firms.

Methodology
Since evidence in support of various risk management theories remains mixed I found there is a need to design a study, which will bring these theories together and test them on a single sample using robust methodology. This approach allows comparison of theories and their assumptions and can provide better indication of possible ways to develop new theoretical models. The sections below explains in detail the study design issues. Secondly, due to ongoing economic transition there are fewer historical and institutional determinants of the current state of risk management in Poland than there might be in the USA, UK, or Germany. Thirdly, sufficient financial market infrastructure does exist in Poland for companies to engage in risk management. Consequently, Polish companies can implement financial risk management processes provided they find them useful.
The sample was further limited to include only non-financial corporations, that is companies from sectors other than financial services. This approach, adopted by Nance et al. (1993) , Faff and Nguyen (2002) and Berkman and Bradbury (1996) is based on the premise that banks, insurance companies and other financial sector enterprises purchase and issue derivative instruments not only for hedging but also for trading purposes. Since both in these and in my study derivative instruments use is a proxy for hedging such companies had to be excluded from the sample.
When it comes to data collection two alternative approaches to risk management research are present in the literature: use of annual report data and questionnaires. In this study I selected the former option. Although it limits the selection of variables to the contents of official filings, data gathered using this approach are more reliable as they have been prepared using transparent rules specified by regulation. In the case of Poland a new law based on IAS 39 was introduced in 2001, which regulated the disclosure of financial instruments, including hedging. Hence, the beginning of the series was set for the first reports prepared according to that regulation.
After reviewing variable distribution in the sample two largest companies were excluded as outliers. These were Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., the largest telecom provider, and PKN Orlen S.A., the largest oil refinement and distribution company. Both companies where incomparably larger than other companies in the sample and could not be analysed together with the rest of the market. Although both of them used hedging extensively, they would have to be analysed in a sample of large European companies, rather than Polish ones.
Variables
Choice of dependant variable for risk managements studies poses an important methodological problem: in this study I used a binary hedging proxy. I inspected manually annual reports of sample companies to determine whether a company used derivative instruments. If a company did disclose derivatives and did not state that they were used for speculation, I classified it as a hedger. This construction of the hedging variable is of course subject to justified criticism. Jin and Jorion (2006) suggest using delta measures, while Faulkender (2005) stresses the importance of first determining what derivatives are used for.
Other authors point to the significance of non-derivative hedging (Judge 2006) . Nevertheless the binary proxy method has appeared most often in risk management research for practical reasons. I decided to use this approach firstly to maintain comparability with previous research, and secondly, because it was impossible to determine objectively, basing on annual reports, what was the purpose of derivative use, as Polish companies refrain from using hedge accounting due to cumbersome regulatory requirements.
A detailed description of variables is show in Table 1 . Exposure indicators were calculated for EUR/PLN, USD/PLN exchange rates and for WIBOR, EUR LIBOR, and USD LIBOR as betas in a CAPM style rates of return regression, following common practice in the field (e.g. Choi and Prasad, 1995; Bradley and Moles, 2001; Chen and So, 2002; Crabb, 2002) . They were later changed to absolute values, as I was interested in the extent, not the direction of exposure. Sales revenue was used as a scaling variable, since all previous studies showed size to be a strong determinant of risk management practices. Industry coding was done in accordance with the general nomenclature of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
Results
The data was analysed using a number of techniques. All of the analysis was performed in R statistics package. In the first step I carried out tests of means and medians, as is usually done in other studies of this field. The comparison was done in two ways:
statically, by comparing hedgers to non-hedgers, and dynamically, by comparing companies that started to hedge in a given year with companies that did not hedge. I then proceeded to
Hotelling's tests for difference of vectors of means, ANOVA, logit regression, and CART analysis. The last method, CART analysis, is in essence a decision tree method for breaking a sample into two categories using a series of decision nodes. It has not yet become popular in financial research, but as I will show below it has a number of advantages. Univariate tests for the difference of means (table 3) indicated significant differences between hedgers and non-hedgers in size: hedgers tended to be larger both in terms of sales and market value of equity. This has been shown to be true in other markets by all previous studies and is a clear proof of barriers or strong economies of scale which must exist in derivative hedging. However this result contradicts hypotheses 2a, 3c and 4c, all of which imply that smaller, more risky firms should benefit more from implementing hedging. Two other significant differences were in tax charges and individual block ownership. However, the sign in both cases was opposite to the predictions (hypotheses 1h, 2a and 3c).
Comparisons of means between new hedgers and non-hedgers showed only two significant differences in the year 2002 for exposure to EUR/PLN exchange rates and WIBOR interest rate. In general tests in the dynamic approach provided widely varying results, both in terms of magnitude and sign. 
Tests for the difference of medians (table 4) confirmed results of the previous test:
size, tax charges and individual block holding were all significant again. However there were also other significant differences. Hedgers tended to have a higher median of foreign currency assets and liabilities, which would provide a clear reason for hedging. Moreover, they exhibited lower volatility of stock prices (hypothesis 1a) and higher market-to-book value (1j and 4b). Lower volatility is particularly important, as it shows that all other benefits arising form it can be attainable. Test of new hedgers vs. non-hedgers showed no significant differences here. Next, I tested for the multivariate difference of means using Hotelling's test for the difference of vectors of means. The logic behind this test is that while two groups may not exhibit strong differences in terms of individual factors, they may show differences in the combination of these factors. I first grouped hypotheses 1a, 1d, 1h and 1j of financial economics (which could be tested using this method), which produced a vector of means of following variables: volatility, gearing, tax charge, and market-to-book value. The statistic for years 2001-2003 was respectively 35.52, 74.08 and 86.30; in all cases much above the 5% confidence level mark of 10.048. Unfortunately one cannot tell from this result which factors were significant. By comparing this to univariate tests it can be seen that only the tax charge was significant, although with the wrong sign. Hypotheses 1c, 1e and 1i for the new-hedgers could not be tested using this method due to a singular covariance matrix.
Hotelling's test also gave positive results for hypotheses 2a and 2b of agency theory, with a score of 24.99, 34.98 and 33.13. However in this case the significant factor was block holding, which had a sign opposite to the predictions. It is therefore hard to determine whether this result is reliable, especially since the difference for gearing was inconclusive both in significance and sign.
Analysis of variance was a suitable method for testing hypotheses which required breaking the sample into more than two groups: hypotheses 1f, 1g, 2c, 2d, 3a-3d, and 4a. The first of these, hypothesis 1f, stated that hedging should be more popular among firms with low, but higher than one, times interest earned ratios. To test this, I divided the sample companies into three groups: ratio below one, ratio above one but below the median, and ratio above the median. There was however no significant difference between groups Agency theory hypothesis 2c stated that companies motivated to hedging might be ones with low equity/total assets ratios which raise their gearing level subsequently. To test it I created two new variables: low equity/total asset ratio (split at the median) and rise in gearing (with two levels, 'increase' and 'decrease'). Results showed no significant differences Logit regression has also been used in similar studies, which motivated me to employ it in my analysis. However I decided not to pool all the variables together in one regression model, but rather create separate models for different theories. I created one equation for hedgers vs. non-hedgers hypotheses and another for new-hedgers vs. non-hedgers hypotheses of all the theories. I estimated the equations separately for each of the three years to compare stability of results -all significant variables maintained their sign and coefficient values changed only slightly, while insignificant variable coefficients varied widely. Table 6 shows results for equations estimated on 2002 data, which were consistently best in terms of significance, fit and prediction accuracy. All attempts to model new-hedgers vs. non-hedgers produced insignificant results. Hence, I did not provide a detailed table of results.
Two equations failed to produce any significant results: agency theory model, where hedging was to be correlated with individual block ownership and gearing, and new institutional economics equation, which focused on shareholder structure. Whereas NEI hypotheses were tested only as a pilot study, agency theory results are important, as I obtained negative results also in previous tests. Surprisingly, stakeholder theory model had two significant variables -MTBV and SALES -although the overall fit was low, and prediction accuracy poor. A much better result was obtained by financial economics model, where three variables were significant: expEUR, expUSD and MTBV. Two variables had signs opposite to expected: exposure to USD/PLN had a negative sign (exposure variables were in absolute values), and income tax had a positive coefficient.
To compare my results with previous studies I finally pooled all the variables together. I obtained a good fit with high prediction accuracy. The singificant variables were:
exposure to USD and EUR rates, volatility, MTBV, IT and Services sector and size (sales).
Predictions were quite accurate: 67% and 70% of correct hits, with 36% and 41% of false positives. The number of false positives could be decreased, although at the expense of positive hits, by estimating an equation with only the significant variables (table 6) . The final method I used was the classification and regression trees (CART) algorithm for determining which of the factors suggested by theory provide best criteria for distinguishing hedgers from non-hedgers. This method, developed originally by Breiman et al. (1984) , is an algorithm which produces a decision tree consisting of a hierarchy of criteria for splitting a sample into two groups. In the case of risk management CART models provide a non-linear method for distinguishing hedgers from non-hedgers. It allows not only for nonlinearity of relationships but also non-linearity of variables, sub-sample heterogeneity and existence of outliers. For example, CART can allow finding differences in hedging determinants between small and large companies, rather than mix the two together like other methods do. The algorithm takes all variables as input, unlike the logit method, and determines which provide best classification criteria. Estimated trees can then be tested using predictions for other periods or samples. I computed separate models for each of the three periods and then cross-verified. The following models were computed using rpart library.
There is one methodological note to be made here. CART models take one set of arbitrary parameters -cost of misclassification matrix -which can potentially influence the results. By default the matrix is set to equal costs for all errors. However, in this study I was interested in identifying hedgers, and it could be argued that there are some companies that and 51% accuracy, and were consistently above the proportion of hedgers in the sample, which is the threshold above which we can say the algorithm produces significant results.
The CART method failed totally however in distinguishing new-hedgers from non-hedgers, which was not a surprise, considering results of previous analyses. , timber products, machinery, energy, trade, IT, media, metal, clothing and services; industry2 stands for chemical, machinery, trade and food) . , machinery, trade, IT, construction materials, clothing, food, telecom, services and 'other') (IT and services sector), and 4b (intangible assets) were positively verified. In addition I
Fig. 1. Classification tree for hedgers (Y) vs. non-hedgers (N) based on 2002 data (industry1 stands for construction
Fig. 2. Classification tree for hedgers (Y) vs. non-hedgers (N) based on 2003 data (industry3 stands for construction
found that three variables were significant as well: size of the company (+), exposure to EUR/PLN rate (+), and foreign currency assets and liabilities as percentage of sales (+).
Finally, my attempts to verify determinants of starting hedging failed, and therefore provide no basis for discussion.
A closer look at the hypotheses which were positively verified makes it apparent that hypotheses 4b and 1j were tested using the same variable -market-to-book value. Although I tried to verify hypothesis 1j using two other variables: R&D expenditure and capital expenditure, none of these proved significant and both had negative coefficients in logit models. Hence, a question arises if the significance of MTBV variable supports the internal financing hypothesis 1j, or intangible assets hypothesis 4b. The insignificance of other measures of growth options and evidence provided in other studies in support of costs of financial distress (Judge, 2006) hypotheses seem to point to the latter hypothesis.
The conclusion of low empirical verification of the theories may be questioned on methodological grounds. In fact, there is a number of problems in empirical analysis of risk management. Firstly, it may be argued that the sample does not allow generalisations.
However, this argument does not stand to closer inspection. The discipline of economics assumes that all people and organisations are, at least limitedly, rational, no matter in which market they act. With the exception of new institutional economics, none of the theories under investigation make any inferences as to cultural or country differences. Moreover, results match those from previous studies surveyed in the second section of this paper.
Secondly, cross-industry sample studies suffer from endogeneity issues (Jin, Jorion, 2006) . We can never be sure that a significant correlation is not in fact spurious, related to a third factor. For this reason I included dynamic hypotheses and tested for determinants of starting hedging in my study, following Guay (1999) , although without significant results. I also included industry variables, which proved to be significant.
Thirdly, the reader might question, why I did not use panel regression in logit estimation, rather then estimate separate models for each year. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, ANOVA tests showed no significant difference in hedging activity between the periods. Secondly, I wanted to cross-verify results by running predictions from the estimated equations on the rest of data, as exhibited in table 6.
Finally, the very concept of negative or low verification may be called into question.
After all most studies focus on finding empirical support for theories, and either succeed or not, without drawing conclusions as to the usefulness of tested theories. This problem has been extensively discussed in the past, with arguments ranging from popperian falsification (Popper, 1959) , to neo-classical non-falsification (e.g. Machlup, 1967) . My position on this issue is that although we need to be careful before we discard a theory, critical testing of theories and their assumptions is essential to research progress. This study does not stand alone in exhibiting the shortcomings of present theories, but has been preceded by over a decade of empirical research which points clearly to low verification of theories in question.
Moreover, the aim of this study is not to suggest discarding the theories but to bring the theories together, test them in a systematic fashion and identify possibilities for further conceptual research in this area.
Conclusion
This paper investigated main theories of risk management: financial economics, agency theory, stakeholder theory and new institutional economics. Results have shown that financial economics and agency theory hypothesis found little supporting evidence, while the two recent approaches, stakeholder and NEI may be offering new insights into the determinants of risk management. The poor results clearly indicate that there must be other significant factors, not included in present theories. Further research will be needed to identify these factors, and later incorporate them into a comprehensive theoretical model which will explain risk management practices of firms better.
Results point to practical considerations as main determinants of risk management:
firms were found to be hedging in response to foreign currency exposure, and it was mostly large firms. This implies that managers considering implementation of financial risk management should first look at their direct exposures,and consider what other companies in the market are doing rather than analyse the problem along the lines of theory.
Future research may focus on these practical reasons and their implications for corporate value. On the other hand, hedging is linked to stock volatility and market value.
The question remains as to the causal relationship between this variables. There is a needed to depart from the eclectic approach to risk management theory and attempt construction of a new, comprehensive theoretical model, which would cover all of the empirically identified determinants of risk management.
